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“Statute? What Statute?” – Norm hierarchy and judicial law-
making in international criminal law at the example of the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
 
 
 
Michael Bohlander 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Since 1945, international criminal justice has been one continuous construction site, an 
expression of the attitude of international stakeholders and policy-makers that favours temporary 
solutions to contemporary problems. Even with the creation of the ICC that has not really 
changed. The history of international criminal procedure until the advent of the ICC has 
substantially been one of cobbling together building blocks from different traditions in order to 
create a new sui generis system based on extrapolations from Article 38(1) of the Statute of the 
ICJ and the history of Nuremberg, Tokyo and the other post-war military tribunals. This eclectic 
approach has unfortunately been combined with a plethora of regulatory lacunae left to the 
judges of the tribunals by the international (for want of a better word:) law-making bodies, a 
criticism that applies to the ICC as well, albeit clearly to a lesser degree. The ‘sui generis’ system 
seems nonetheless to have had mainly adversarial overtones.
1
 Even in cases where the statute of 
a tribunal, such as the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), provides for the adaptation of a civil 
law model,
2
 the court's judges in their rule-making power have, as will be shown below, 
blindsided the drafters of the Statute and introduced a way for the court to revert to what is in 
essence an adversarial model. Interesting as the developments in international criminal law may 
appear if viewed as a ‘legal laboratory”, the fact remains that courts, which deal with putting 
people away for many years for horrendous crimes, must first of all strive for legal certainty. 
This paper will argue that the current unprincipled state of affairs is unsatisfactory, and that a 
                                                          
1
 See, for example, the admission by Judge O-Gon Kwon of the ICTY in a speech in 2011, in  Göran Sluiter et al. 
(eds.), International Criminal Procedure – Principles and Rules, OUP, 2013 at 1417. 
2
 The Cambodian Court, the ECCC, has a judge-led trial model as far as questioning of witnesses is concerned that 
is similar to that of the Lebanese law – see Sluiter, ibid., at 703 and the text below. 
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move to a system is necessary which protects the defence and keeps the prosecution in check by, 
among other things, ensuring sanctions for premature assurances
3
 of trial-readiness – an issue 
brought into sharp relief at the STL in the controversy about joining the case of a fifth accused at 
the eleventh hour to that of the four fist accused when the trial was weeks away, when their case 
had been developing for far over a year and the identity of the fifth accused had been known all 
along as well.  
 
The temporary nature of the present system which mainly uses adversarial models is based to a 
large extent on an unprincipled reliance on supposedly “ready-made” and “tried and tested” 
solutions from as well as the experience of staff employed at previous tribunals. The use of the 
adversarial model is thus not based on a principled evaluation of its usefulness and effectiveness 
in the international context but on a default attitude of the lawyers creating and populating 
international tribunals, and possibly the diplomatic community in the wider sense. As will be 
shown at the example of the Lebanon Tribunal, sometimes the opposing intentions of the drafters 
of a Statute are undermined by adversarially-minded judges. The author does not advance the 
suggestion that the adversarial model as such lacks capacity for permanence, and if the 
international justice system had used the inquisitorial approach in the same manner as it has the 
adversarial one, the same comments would apply mutatis mutandis. Yet, as things stand at the 
moment, the temporary quality is factually tied to the adversarial model.  
 
A case in point – the STL 
 
To clarify the point made about the STL and temporariness, it bears remembering that this 
tribunal was not meant to address international offences such as war crimes, crimes against 
humanity or genocide, but a simple if major terrorist attack in Lebanon and that it should apply 
substantive Lebanese law. The international involvement was merely due to the inability of the 
Lebanese judicial system to deal with this kind of violence itself. That did not stop the STL 
Appeals Chamber with its former President Cassese as reporting judge from trying to 
                                                          
3
 There may, however, also be different understandings of what the function of an indictment is. In the ICTY it 
seemed that it had almost the effect that an authorisation by the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber for the initiation of an 
investigation has; in civil law countries such as Germany, for example, the indictment is the final product of the 
investigations. 
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internationalise the domestic law on terrorism in its (in)famous Rule 176bis decision
4
 and from 
muddying the waters by introducing international concepts of participation and multiple charging 
when the need for that was not entirely clear from looking at the domestic law. The procedural 
part was left in a mixed state but especially on the conduct of the trial proceedings there was an 
interesting reference in the STL Statute, namely Article 20(2): 
 
Unless otherwise decided by the Trial Chamber in the interests of justice, examination of 
witnesses shall commence with questions posed by the presiding judge, followed by questions 
posed by other members of the Trial Chamber, the Prosecutor and the Defence.
5
  
 
This mode of questioning is clearly reminiscent of the judge-driven civil law model which 
applies in Lebanese law, unless the interests of justice require something else. The Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence (RPE) drafted by the judges provide for a means of avoiding the 
statutory approach, and it is the reasoning that is interesting. 
 
Rule 145 Questioning of Witnesses  
   
(A) Where the Trial Chamber considers that the file submitted by the Pre-Trial Judge enables it to 
adopt the mode of proceeding outlined in Article 20(2) of the Statute, after the opening statements 
of the Parties and of any victim participating in the proceedings, each witness shall first be 
questioned by the Presiding Judge and any other member of the Chamber, then by the Party that 
has called the witness, and subsequently cross-examined by the other Party, if the other Party 
elects to exercise its right of cross-examination. The witness may also subsequently be re-
examined by the calling Party.   
 
(B) Where the Trial Chamber considers that the file submitted by the Pre-Trial Judge is not such 
as to enable it to adopt the mode of proceeding envisaged in Article 20(2) of the Statute, after the 
opening statements of the Parties and of any victim participating in the proceedings, the witnesses 
called before the Trial Chamber shall first be examined by the Party that called them, then cross-
examined by the other Party, if the other Party elects to exercise its right of cross-examination. 
                                                          
4
 Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., Case No. STL-11-01/I, Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism. 
Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging of 16 February 2011 – online at http://www.stl-
tsl.org/en/the-cases/stl-11-01/rule-176bis – but see  Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., Case No. STL-ll-
01IPT/ACIR176bis,  Decision on Defence Requests for Reconsideration of the Appeals Chamber’s Decision of 16 
February 2011, of 18 July 2012, para. 37, where the Appeals Chamber – this time without Judge Cassese – already 
adopted a more flexible approach. 
5
 Emphasis added. 
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The witness may also subsequently be re- examined by the calling Party. The Presiding Judge and 
other members of the Trial Chamber may at any time ask questions.   
 
(C) The Trial Chamber may decide to depart from the modes of proceeding provided for in 
paragraphs (A) and (B) wherever it considers that this is required by the interests of justice.
6
 
 
Note that Article 20(2) talks about the interests of justice as the only criterion for deviating from 
the normal order of things. Rule 145(A) introduces a new concept, namely the question whether 
in effect the prosecution dossier submitted by the pre-trial judge as the ‘case file’ is sufficient for 
the trial chamber judges to run the trial themselves. It already deviates without any apparent 
justification from the clear order established in Article 20(2): Court – prosecution – defence; the 
Statute does not refer to who called the party. It is in substance identical with the rules under 
Lebanese criminal procedure, namely Articles 180 and 181 of the 2001 Code of Criminal 
Procedure (CCP) for proceedings before the single judge and Articles 255 – 260 CPP for trial 
before the full criminal court; Article 260 CPP even restricts the right of the parties to ask 
questions of witnesses in that they have to be made through the presiding judge. The CPP is 
available on the STL’s website and, indeed, one of the Lebanese appellate judges was 
responsible for its publication at the time the CPP was passed.  
 
Rule 145(B) then takes the bold step to say that if the case file is not sufficient for the judges to 
proceed as under Article 20(2), the chamber may revert to adversarial mode. In other words, if 
the file does not provide a sound basis to the standard required to follow the procedure as 
foreseen in the hiearchically superior Statute, another procedure can be followed which divests 
the trial chamber of the control of the presentation of the evidence and shifts control to the 
prosecution. This is in substance nothing else but allowing the prosecution – via the pre-trial 
judge – to declare trial readiness when it is in fact not ready, because if it were, then the file 
would contain all the material the trial chamber would need to proceed as ordered by Article 
20(2). How this can be in the interests of justice is unclear, to say the least. It might in extreme 
cases also mean that even though the case file was as complete as possible at the time, the judges 
could revert to adversarial mode if none of them was comfortable with or experienced in running 
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 Emphasis added. 
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a pro-actively judge-led trial.
7
 Given the systemic or professional provenance of many 
international judges in general that would not seem to be an unreasonable inference.  
 
In the context of the STL there would have been enough experienced Lebanese judges who could 
have used the Lebanese system effortlessly. The presiding judge did not have to be an 
international one. No-one suggests that the Lebanese judges would be biased merely qua being 
Lebanese – otherwise they should not be on the bench under the criteria of Article 9(1) of the 
Statute. Yet, the Lebanese judges would have been uncomfortable with and lacked experience in 
the largely adversarial set-up brought about by the RPE. Why this was done when Article 28(2) 
of the Statute states that in drafting the RPE 
 
the judges shall be guided, as appropriate, by the Lebanese Code of Criminal Procedure, as well as 
by other reference materials reflecting the highest standards of international criminal procedure, 
with a view to ensuring a fair and expeditious trial 
 
remains open to question. Why not simply adopt the relevant sections of the CPP and make sure 
they comply with the afore-mentioned standards? Maybe because that would have made the 
ubiquitous ‘tribunal-hopping’ of staff and prosecutors from other tribunals more difficult? 
Maybe because the first President in charge of the STL had already had the experience of 
drafting a set of RPE at another international tribunal and it seemed less burdensome to adapt 
these to the STL’s environment – with the innovation of a separate pre-trial (but not 
investigating) judge already having been secured in the Statute? But then the one major 
controversial item in the STL and CPP arsenal of procedural tools from a human rights standards 
                                                          
7
 In this context, it is not uncommon to hear the question “How does this affect justice?”. This question seems to 
proceed from an undefined and almost nebulously philosophical idea of justice that is distinct and uncoupled from 
any of its real-world incarnations within a particular procedural framework and is akin to asking whether the trial 
would not be “fair” otherwise. The answer to that is, firstly, that, as we have accepted, both adversarial and 
inquisitorial models can achieve comparable levels of fairness but as we shall argue, they do not reach the same 
degree of efficiency. Secondly, and more to the theoretical point, it is the procedural model as set out in a statute etc. 
that defines the ambit of the powers of the prosecution and the judges, as well as the rights of the defence and the 
victims. It is dangerous to tamper with a balanced system based on whims arising from perceived individual 
injustices, as this tends to upset the balance and lead to inroads into a party’s legal positions, and more often than not 
those of the defence. Finally, although positivism does no longer have a very favourable press these days when the 
famous Radbruch Formula about unjust law is trotted out regularly, it bears reminding oneself that to rely on a 
notion as abstract as that of “natural justice” for use – in an individual case – as a substantive corrective criterion to 
procedural rules laid down by (a written) law is at the end of the day nothing short of allowing judges to discard 
such laws if they deem them unfair or unwieldy, beyond the reach of the method of accepted teleological 
interpretation. Substance without form is arbitrariness. 
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point of view, namely the trial in absentia, had also already been anchored in Article 22 of the 
Statute – for obvious reasons, because no-one at the time really anticipated that any of the 
suspects would ever attend trial, not least since Hezbollah had always made that clear. The 
Statute itself is thus somewhat contradictory with respect to what it regards as the ‘highest 
standards of international criminal procedure’, when all other international courts and tribunals, 
including the European Court of Human Rights, have always shied away from the procedure in 
absentia like, as it were, the Devil from holy water. Finally, what the exact content of Rule 
145(C) RPE is, remains equally uncertain: neither judge-led nor adversarial but …? The judges 
of the STL’s Trial Chamber in the case of Ayyash et al. predictably reverted to the adversarial 
mode when the trial began on 16 January 2014
8
. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
This brief excursion into the law of just one tribunal has hopefully shown what effects the ‘draft-
as-you-go’ approach as an expression of temporariness can entail. It opens the building of the 
administration of justice up to intruders with separate agendas and to political negotiations that 
would appear to fit and fix the temporary emergency and to fill the temporary gaps in the law 
needed for the fixing. A proper and detailed Code of International Criminal Procedure applicable 
to any and all international criminal courts and tribunals – and this author in the final analysis 
argues for nothing less – would mean a big step away from these constant uncertainties. After all, 
no-one would want to be faced with a justice system as it currently exists on the international 
level, were they to face trial at home even on lesser charges than genocide. In this context, the 
highest international justice standards must not fall below their highest national counterparts – 
and legal certainty is a fundamental one among their number. 
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 See Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., Case No. STL-11-01/T/TC, Directions on the Conduct of the Proceedings, of 16 
January 2014, online at www.stl-tsl.org/en/the-cases/stl-11-01/main/filings/other-filings/trial-chamber/f1326. 
